Transformacija političkih sustava u Sjevernoj Africi i Srednjoj Americi by Borna Zgurić & Lidija Kos-Stanišić
RESEaRch aRTIcLE
d o I: 10.20901/PP.8.1-2.01
the transformation of Political 
Systems in north africa and  
Central america:  
an Inter-regional Comparison
Borna Zgurić
Faculty of Political Science
University of Zagreb
Lidija Kos-Stanišić
Faculty of Political Science
University of Zagreb
Summary
From the very beginning of the so-called arab Spring in the winter of 2010, di-
fferent authors drew parallels with the fall of communism and the democra-
tization of eastern europe in 1989/1991. even the name given to the political 
processes of the 2010 in north africa was similar to the names of the political 
changes in communist eastern europe. the eastern europe parallel was stron-
gly emphasized and the arguments that accompany it do carry some weight. 
However, this paper claims that because of the specificity of the communist re-
gimes in eastern europe, its comparison to the arab Spring is not completely 
adequate. eastern europe went through a triple transition and was later hea-
vily influenced by the allure to join the european union, unlike north africa. 
therefore, this paper stipulates that the arab Spring is more adequately com-
pared to the democratization of Central america then the democratization of 
eastern europe.
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From the very beginning of the so-called arab Spring in the winter of 2010 
and its bursting to flames in the spring of 2011, both media and academic 
commentators (Way 2011; Saideman 2012), compared it to the fall of 
communism and the democratization of eastern europe in 1989/91. even 
the name given to this political phenomenon is similar to the names of 
the political changes in communist eastern europe like the Prague spring 
of 1968 or the Croatian Spring of 1971. Wiarda (2012: 134) claims that the 
name arab Spring derives from the title of his friend Bill taubman’s book 
Moscow Spring. the parallel with eastern europe could not be emphasized 
any stronger and the arguments that accompany it do carry some weight.1 
We claim, however, that due to the specificity of the communist regimes 
in eastern europe, the comparison with the arab Spring is inadequate. 
the arab Spring, we believe, is more readily comparable with the demo-
cratization of Latin america.2 In this sense, using primarily (but not exclu-
sively) the theoretical framework laid down by offe (1991) and using the 
methodological approach of inter-regional comparison, we will test this 
hypothesis. 
We will compare the political transformations of two regions – Latin 
america and the Middle east – that is, more specifically, the political 
transformations of the countries from two sub-regions – north africa 
and Central america. We focus on north africa because it is a trendsetter 
within the wider region. one of the north african countries – algeria – 
was the first arab country that attempted democratization much prior 
to the events of the arab Spring. tunisia is the only success story of the 
arab Spring, and egypt was for a long time a role model for many other 
arab republics. Gaddafi’s Libya had a rather unique political system which 
1  Zgurić (2014) also identified the fact that when a popular uprising is given the name 
“spring”, in most cases the popular uprising will fail. this was both true for eastern europe 
“springs” as it is true for the arab Spring.
2  this is not to say that we are implying that there are “better” or “worse” comparations and 
comparative research designs. We just believe, following our prior research on both regions, 
that Latin america and the Middle east share more similar characteristics with each other 
than with the eastern europe. In this sense our research design can be to an extent, but not 
completely, described as the use of most similar systems design while there are similarities 
between two regions with different transformation outcomes. on the other hand, Latin amer-
ican and eastern european cases could be compared using the most different systems design, 
while Middle eastern and east european Cases for example, or all three regions, could be 
compared using the qualitative comparative analysis. In a way, the aim of this paper is to high-
light the need to put more emphasis on control variables while selecting cases for research. 
For different comparative research strategies see: Landman (2008).
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differed from other the republics and monarchies of the region.3 Central 
america, on the other hand, shares the same phenomena as South america 
– european colonial government, wars for independence, bloody civil 
conflicts, authoritarian governments, army rule and democratic transition. 
the Central american states, however, are among endangered states of the 
world due to natural disasters. Furthermore, the united States considers 
them as a sphere of its vital interest since the 19th century. thus, the subre-
gion has experienced numerous american interventions, of which the most 
significant were during the civil wars and interstate conflicts which affected 
the region during the 1980s. after the conflicts ended and the peace trea-
ties were signed, democratic transition took place, but they did not bring 
much peace to Central america. therefore, we consider Central america 
to be a subregion of Latin america, but also a region in its own right that 
consists of even smaller subregions (Kos-Stanišić 2013).
the paper is divided into three sections. In the first section we present 
the theoretical and methodological framework of the paper; in the second, 
we present the transformation of the north african regimes; while in the 
third the political transformation of the Central american countries.
2. theoretical and methodological framework
our research question is: is the democratic transition, or rather the tran-
sformation of political systems, in countries affected by the arab Spring 
more akin to that in eastern europe or to that in Latin america? our 
hypothesis is that the transformation of political systems in north africa 
are more akin to the one in Central america, although each of these regions 
has its own specificities (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2007). the focus of 
our analysis is the democratic transition, or rather, the transformation of 
political systems. We understand the democratic transition as a transition 
to democracy, while the transformation of political systems not only as a 
one-way political process leading to democracy, but also as regime change, 
change of government, change of the system of government (Merkel 2011), 
and so on. this should be taken into consideration because transitions to 
democracy are susceptible to counter waves, frequent in Latin america, 
and happening also in the arab Spring countries.
as stated before, some scholars believe that the arab Spring tran-
sformation resembles the transformation of the communist regimes in 
eastern europe. Both, the eastern europe regime collapse and the arab 
Spring, claims Way (2011) took scholars by surprise, because seemingly 
stabile regimes began falling like dominos. the diffusion effect showed 
3  although it should be mentioned that Lebanon’s confessional democracy is also rather 




its strength in both regions. the romanian communist leader, nicolae 
Ceausescu and the Libyan Colonel Gaddafi met their ends in a similar 
fashion. Following the collapse of the old regimes, in both regions, the old 
elites acted in ways previously unimaginable. In egypt, for example, the 
Supreme Council of armed Forces (SCaF) arrested Mubarak and put him 
on trial. the communists in the former uSSr abolished the Communist 
Party and proclaimed their support for democratic changes. the counter-
transition wave that hit the former uSSr countries, was also, according 
to Way (2011), threatening the north african democratizers – something 
we have been witnessing. Saideman (2012), on the other hand, insists that 
the arab Spring in fact bears most similarities to the events in the former 
Yugoslavia during the 1990s because the Yugoslav republics “imitated” the 
democratic changes happening in their midst. Like the spread of ethnic 
conflict in former Yugoslavia, the spread of the arab Spring was coupled 
with conflicts like the civil wars in Syria, Yemen and Libya, or political 
repression over the opposition in Bahrain (Saideman 2012, 717). 
the diffusion effect is thus well established in both regions, but still, 
from the wider perspective of the so-called third wave of democratiza-
tion (Huntington 1991), the diffusion effect was also present in Southern 
europe and Latin america. therefore, we need to construct more specific 
variables which are going to help us find the similarities and, more impor-
tant for our purpose, the differences between eastern europe and north 
africa. as a first step, let us establish the specificities of the eastern euro-
pean transitions to democracy, compared to those in Southern europe 
and Latin america.
the nature of the transition in eastern europe and its differences from 
the one in Southern europe and Latin america was highlighted by Claus 
offe (1991).4 offe (1991: 867–868) states that research on democratic tran-
sitions after WWII focused on three country clusters. the first cluster 
included the post-war democracies of West Germany, Italy and japan; 
the second cluster comprised the Mediterranean states – Portugal, Spain 
and Greece; while the third cluster comprised the Latin american states – 
4  offe was not the only one who believed that due to the substantial differences between 
regions the transition to democracy in eastern europe would be if not impossible than it 
would be rather improbable. Sarah terry (1993) also concluded that there were much more 
differences than communalities between the regions and that these differences in the end will 
determine the outcome of transformations. Merkel (2006) calls this the theory of inability and 
admits himself that he fell into the trap of this fallacy, while later he proved that transitions 
in the eastern europe were quite successful. However, Schmitter and Karl (1994) although 
they admit that inter-regional differences are substantial they do believe that all cases of the 
third wave democratization should be analyzed together, never mind their geopolitical posi-
tion or cultural context, and focus on the same outcomes – successful democratization. In 
this sense the most different system design is useful.
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argentina, Brazil, uruguay, Chile and Paraguay. However, the democratic 
transition in eastern europe was quite different from the previous cases. 
In the three clusters identified by offe, all countries, except for Germany, 
preserved their territorial integrity,5 while the eastern bloc states experi-
enced territorial conflicts, migrations, nationalistic conflicts and conflicts 
with national minorities and secessionist tendencies (1991: 868). Further-
more, the transformation in the first three clusters was political and consti-
tutional in nature, or as offe (1991: 868) describes it, the transformation 
was related to the “form of government and legal relations between the 
state and the society.” the changes did not include the transformation 
from socialist to market economy. In other words, eastern european states 
went through a “triple transformation”, which included states breaking 
up and nation building, constitutional transformation to democracy and 
economic transformation from socialism to market economy (offe 1991). 
no small difference either, but the autocracies in Latin america and north 
africa were not totalitarian in contrast to the periods of totalitarianism in 
communist europe.6
the role of the eu, or the eeC then (Way 2011) and the previously hege-
monic role of the uSSr (Linz and Stepan 1998) are also brought up as 
important factors distinguishing eastern europe from the previous cases 
of transition to democracy. States that wanted to become members of the 
eeC had to maintain their democratic course and successfully conclude 
the democratic reforms. It must be admitted that the role of the eu, as a 
democratic promotor, was quite more important in the Central and South 
european (Balkan) post-communist countries, whereas eu had far less 
influence on the post-Soviet space (Levitsky and Way 2010, 89–90). as for 
the uSSr, it “guarded the socialist revolution in eastern europe not only 
ideologically, but also militarily with armed forces in each Warsaw pact 
member, ready to intervene as in the case of Czechoslovakia in 1968. after 
the dissolvement of the uSSr russia retained the role of the so-called 
5  until 1989 only 9 states existed in communist europe, while after the fall of commu-
nism 27 states were created, 15 from the uSSSr (Linz and Stepan 1998, 273). We should add 
Montenegro gaining its independence in 2006 and Kosovo proclaiming independence in 
2008 to this count.
6  Hannah ardent (1996) claims that the uSSr was, during a specific time period, one of 
the only two totalitarian states, the other of course being nazi Germany. Merkel (2011) writes 
about post-totalitarian states in eastern europe, like Czechoslovakia and rumania, which 
means that at one point at time they were totalitarian. the regimes in north africa were 
never totalitarian. In their beginnings they could be described, using Linz’s (2000) defini-
tion, as postcolonial mobilization regimes. In their essence they had totalitarian tenden-
cies, but they never achieved them. When it comes to Latin america, o’donnell, Schmitter 
and Whitehead (1986) write about transition from authoritarianism, while totalitarianism 




black knight7 in some, but not all, of the post-Soviet states (Levitsky and 
Way 2010, 185). this hegemonial position did not exist in Latin america 
or the Middle east, although the united States and some other Western 
countries played the role of external veto actors (Stepan and Linz 1998; 
Bellin 2004). 
It is thus possible to single out three variables that distinguish the tran-
sitions from communist rule from the previous transitions to democracy: 
“triple transformation,” international influence of veto actors (or hegemon) 
on the transformation, and the desirability of democratic reforms for atta-
ining membership in international integrations or alliances. In the rest of 
the paper, applying inter-regional comparison8, we will use these variables 
to highlight the similarities between Latin america and the Middle east, or 
rather their sub-regions of Central america and north africa, based on the 
differences between these two regions and eastern europe. although this 
research strategy is extremely rare (Basedau and Köllner 2007; Mainwa-
ring and Pérez-Liñán 2007), it will allow us to focus on the transformation 
processes as regional processes and compare them (2007). 
3. the transformation of political systems  
in north africa
the end of the WWII meant the entrance of eastern europe into the 
communist camp. However, the end of WWII and the spread of the “icy 
blaze” of the Cold War slowly but surely led to the politics of decoloni-
zation in the third World. the arab world was no exception to the rule. 
Independence during that period in many arab countries resulted with the 
instalment of centralized presidential republican regimes – later labelled 
as authoritarian – which was, to some degree, the result of arab leaders 
wishing to preserve their hard-gained independence (owen 2013). this 
is also the period when the same arab regimes started taking the path of 
arab socialism. However, arab socialism soon met its end, facing the poli-
7  In this sense the “black knights” are “counter-hegemonic powers whose economic, mili-
tary and/or diplomatic support helps blunt the impact of u.S. or eu democratizing, pres-
sure” (Levitsky and Way 2010, 41).
8  there are three types of comparative area studies – intra-regional, inter-regional and 
cross-regional comparative area studies (Basedau and Köllner 2007). Intra-regional compara-
tive area studies are the best known and the most common form of comparative area studies. 
Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2007: 199) concluded that around 70 percent of all articles in 
the three strongest journals for comparative politics by 2007 dealt exclusively with one region. 
this type of area studies compares different political processes, like democratic transition, 
within the countries of the same region (i.e. democratic transition in Latin america). Cross-
regional comparative area studies compare analytical units from different regions, like the 
role of the state in economic development of Korea, Brazil, India or nigeria (2007).
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cies of economic liberalization. In this paper we will analyze four north 
african countries – egypt, Libya, algeria and tunisia. We will leave out 
Morocco from the analysis primarily because it is a monarchy that was 
barely touched by the arab Spring, or more precisely, because there was 
no regime change. although algeria did not experience a regime change 
during the arab Spring, it had its original ‘spring’ in the early 1990s. egypt 
is included in this analysis because most of its territory lies on the african 
continent, although it is considered to be more of a Middle eastern than 
a north african country.
3.1. triple transformation?
as offe (1991) claims, eastern europe went through a triple transforma-
tion. north africa did not. Furthermore, Bogaert (2013) believes that the 
arab Spring was, to a certain degree, a result of the rebellion of the people 
against some 30 years of neoliberal policies carried out by the regimes in 
the region. even the IMF, prior to the beginning of the arab Spring, praised 
some north african countries for their sound economic policies and their 
dedication to free market reforms (Bogaert 2013). 
Still, prior to the free-market reforms of the 80’s, the north african 
countries were “building” arab socialism. the rise of arab socialism was 
tied to ideological roots of popular leaders like nasser or political parties 
like the Ba’ath party in Syria and Iraq (Bogaert 2013). tunisia, algeria and 
Libya, after their revolutionary struggles in the 1950s and 1960s, also started 
implementing socialist economic policies and hence “elaborate welfare 
bureaucracies,” (anderson 1997, 130) were installed throughout north 
africa. In egypt, after nasser’s coup in 1952 and the instalment of one-
party autocracy of the arab Socialist union, the policies of economic nati-
onalization began, as wealth was previously in the hands of egypt’s traditi-
onal upper class (King 2007). By doing this, nasser discarded the policies 
of economic and political liberalism of the interwar era (1921–1942). 
In tunisia, Bourgiba first initiated the liberal economic policies (1956–
1961) and, after the failure of these policies, implemented the arab soci-
alism (King 2009, 48). In the 1970s, Gaddafi conducted radical socio-
economic policies of redistribution and nationalization (St john 2008, 
60). Socialism was an integral part of most revolutions in the 20th century 
and Gaddafi’s Libya was no exception. In 1978, the second part of Gaddafi’s 
“Green Book” was published, more precisely, the publication under the title 
“the Solution of the economic Problem: ‘Socialism’” (St john 2011, 129). the 
praxis of socialist economic policies afterward was hastened, and in 1981 
the Libyan GPC (General People’s Congress), a body which can be consi-
dered the Libyan parliament, announced that by the end of the year, the 




after its independence, which was the result of eight years of bloody war 
with France (1954–1962), implemented a command economy and a deve-
lopmental strategy which also emphasized the role of the public sector, 
while public enterprises were supposed to be the main carrier of economic 
growth (akacem 2005, 115). the first four-year plan adopted for the 1970–
1973 period was based on industrialization and social justice (Benziane 
2005, 102). However, despite the dedication of north african regimes to 
arab socialism, adversities caught up with it in a short while, which in the 
end resulted with gradual economic openings toward market reforms.
the market reforms began in egypt with Sadat in 1974 (infitah). other 
countries in the region, especially the ones without oil, but algeria as well, 
followed that trend. However, it should be emphasized, by doing that, the 
state was not eliminated from the market, but new forms of economic 
relations were created in which the state managed the economy indirectly 
(Bogaert 2013, 222–223). In the mentioned countries entrepreneurs were 
mostly co-opted by the ruling regimes, so the economic system was more 
political capitalism, as defined by Županov (2002), in contrast to entre-
preneurship capitalism, where the market players are (more or less) free 
from the political nomenclature. regional wars, the fall of oil prices and 
corruption are just a few of the causes that led to the inability of the ruling 
regimes to further maintain the programs of social redistribution (Khashan 
2012). as stated before, economic reforms started in egypt in 1974 with 
the opening toward market economy, and privatization was also encou-
raged. However, rapid privatization in egypt started in the 1990s, during 
the Mubarak era (King 2009, 81). In the end, the result was a weakened 
middle class and the strengthening of the super-rich affiliated with the 
military, Mubarak and his family (King 2007). In algeria, the FLn-s – the 
party that ruled algeria starting with the liberation from France in 1962, 
under the leadership of the president Chadli Benjadid – already began with 
small steps towards economic liberalization in the early 1980s, while in the 
late 1980s privatization was hastened (King 2009, 87). 
By the end of the decade, algeria asked IMF for help and the liberaliza-
tion of algerian economy was conducted parallel with the process of demo-
cratization and introduction of a multiparty system (akacem 2005, 116). 
However, the democratic process had its autocratic counter wave, which 
ended up in a decade long civil war. By accepting structural reforms in 
1994, algeria took a path of serious liberalization of its economy. almost 
parallel to that, the oil industry started opening to private capital, as early 
as 1991, and even Sonatrach, algeria’s largest player in this sector, was parti-
ally privatized (2005: 118). In tunisia, Bourgiba began with small economic 
reforms as early as the 1970s; more serious reforms, however, took place 
after his ousting. It is interesting to note that the tunisian Socialist destour 
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Party, after initiating economic liberalization programs, changed its 
name (only) to destour Party (King 2007). tunisia was also affected by an 
economic crisis in the 1980s, and one its results was Ben ali’s ousting of 
Bourgiba. Parallel to these events, a privatization of the economy, starting 
with the IMF’s standby arrangement and the World Bank loans (1986–87), 
was conducted (Kaboub 2013). In 1992, Ben ali concluded that all gover-
nment tenders should pass through the office of the president, hence – 
his hands. this is also the time when tunisia endorsed the Mise à niveau 
policies (programs of structural adjustment) sponsored by the World 
Bank, which led to the privatization of state enterprises (2013). In 1990, 
tunisia also joined Gatt, and from 1995, tunisia was the first Mediterra-
nean non-member country signing the eu contract, which stated that in 
the 1996–2008 period it would lower its tariffs and liberalize trade with the 
eu (2013). a large portion of these policies was the survival strategy of the 
political elites (andersen 1997, 132–133). 
even Libya, from the end of the 1990s, partially abandoned its command 
economy and “turned” to the free market (St john 2008, 53). Gaddafi tried 
to implement some market reforms in 1987, which he described as a “revo-
lution within a revolution” (St john 2011, 131), and which some observers 
called “the Green Perestroika” (St john 2008, 53), but their implementa-
tion failed. this failure of liberalization attempts was accompanied by a 
later one, in 1991 (St john 2011, 127) – both reform attempts were cast away 
by the GPC delegates. despite the failure of these efforts, in the 1990s, libe-
ralization was well on its way, especially by the end of the 1990s, after the 
un sanctions, set up due to the Lockerbie incident, were lifted (2011: 132–
133). In 2003, Gaddafi concluded that the public sector is “broken”, so he 
called for the privatization of the Libyan oil industry. despite the advan-
cement of privatization in the oil sector, privatization in other sectors was 
much slower (St john 2008, 61; 2011, 147). 
at the international level, some significant changes for the region occu-
rred. the region has highly developed trade relations with the eu, so much 
so that in 2005, 64 percent of import and 70 percent of export was with the 
eu. at the same time, tunisia is (alongside Morocco) an exceptionally well-
known tourist destination. tunisia is also a Wto member, whilst algeria 
is in the process of accession9 (escribano and Lorca 2008, 145). tunisia and 
algeria signed the association agreements with the eu, aimed at crea-
ting bilateral zones of free trade. egypt, Morocco, tunisia and jordan are 
founder countries of the agadir Process, the process of forming a free trade 
zone. the agadir agreement was signed in 2005 and ratified a year after, 
with the aim of coming to effect in 2007 (2008: 151). the Process was care-





fully monitored and financially aided by the eu from its very beginning, 
the goal being the deepening of the Mediterranean trade and integration 
(Medea). 
From these descriptions alone, the differences with the eastern europe 
are quite visible. In communist europe, economic liberalization took place 
after the fall of the communist regimes, parallel with democratic transition, 
although Hungary and Yugoslavia started implementing some elements of 
market economies prior to the fall of communism. the process of eu inte-
gration also started after the fall of communism. When the arab Spring 
washed across the shores of the southern Mediterranean, the countries of 
the region had long abandoned arab socialism and dedicated themselves 
to free market reforms, both on the internal and external plain. But, what 
do the other variables tell us?
as stated before, Saideman (2012) compares the wars of secession in 
former Yugoslavia with civil wars in Libya and Syria. However, the civil 
war in Libya was not an ethnic conflict. Furthermore, if we recall the alge-
rian civil war from the 1990s, it was also not an ethnic conflict. Moreover, 
Yugoslavia, after the fall of communism, broke up into six states (Slovenia, 
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia), and 
Kosovo. not a single of the arab Spring countries (including the algeria 
with its civil war), broke up into new states following the democratic 
reforms and autocratic counter wave.
 But, let us only concentrate on north africa. after the 1969 revolu-
tion, Gaddafi did not take a formal role in the political system of Libya. 
Libyan jamahiriya was in theory a direct democracy. In practice, it was 
Gaddafi’s personal dictatorship. the problem with his revolution was that 
it did not create a national identity for the Libyans, or a Libyan nation 
(vandewalle 2011, 236). the Libyan society remained tribally divided, 
which was an ideal recipe for a possible break up of Libya and the crea-
tion of new states. Yet, that did not happen. the uprising and the conflict 
of 2011 started in Benghazi and spread to the east of the country. the 
rebels in Cyrenaica were between a rock and a hard place as they were 
being surrounded by the regime forces. then, on 3rd of March 2011, nato 
intervened on the grounds provided by the Security Council’s resolution 
1973. the transitional national Council (tnC) formed in Cyrenaica was 
“recognized” by the West as a legitimate representative of the Libyan 
people (2011: 236). However, despite the tribal divisions in Libyan society, 
which also dominate the new political system of Libya, there was no 
dissolving of the state. the division on the east-West axis of the country 
(Cyrenaica-tripolitania) also did not happen, despite the visible sparks 
between the eastern and the Western parts of the country during the 
short period following the civil war. In Libya, the Berbers make between 
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eight and nine percent of the population10 (Maddy-Weitzman 2012, 109). 
Gaddafi’s Libya was openly hostile toward the Berber minority. the 
Libyan civil war even turned the spotlight of the world public on the 
Berbers in Libya. Many young Berbers took up weapons and went to 
fight against Gaddafi. after Gaddafi’s fall, the Berbers started gaining 
some rights they did not have before. For instance, tamazight was intro-
duced to school curriculums in Berber villages and towns. tnC’s draft of 
the new constitutional document stated that the language and cultural 
rights of all segments of Libya’s society will be preserved, although arabic 
remained the only official language (2012: 128–129). Yet, honey and milk 
did not flow for the Berbers. the constitutional document stated that the 
Shari’a will be the primary source of legislation, and not a single Berber 
became a member of the interim cabinet formed by the tnC (2012: 131). 
although these moves were worrisome for the Berbers, aspirations for 
independence or violations of territorial integrity of Libya did not rise 
to the surface. 
the civil war in algeria lasted for a decade, with its bloodiest period 
being from 1992–1998. the official data for the 2001-2002 period, tells us 
that around 2.300 died (Martinez 2005, 14). Such a low body count, in 
comparison to prior periods, marked the end of the civil war. the civil war 
itself took away some 150.000 souls (2005: 15), although other sources show 
larger and lesser numbers as well.11 the algerian civil war was the result of 
a failed democratic transition. Yet again, it was not an ethnic conflict but 
rather a conflict between the militant Islamists and the security apparatus 
of the algerian state (Zgurić 2012b). this conflict also did not result in the 
violation of integrity or fragmentation of the algerian territory. Berbers in 
algeria make a higher percentage of the population than in Libya, around 
20 percent (Maddy-Weitzman 2012, 109). as in other north african coun-
tries, the ruling regime in algeria tried to suppress the Berber culture and 
identity through policies of arabization. However, in time these policies 
had quite the opposite effect than the one that the ruling regime whished 
for – Berbers won some concessions instead of being assimilated (2012: 114). 
during the civil war, the identity of the Kabylie Berbers, the largest Berber 
group in algeria, was gaining strength. Still, during that time the regime 
was preoccupied with the Islamists so the “Berber question” remained on 
the margins. In 1994, three general strikes of Berbers demanding their 
cultural and language rights rehabilitated the “Berber question”. two years 
after the tamazight identity was added to the algerian constitution, next to 
the arabic and Islamic one, although the language was not constitutionally 
10  Some 20 million Berbers live in north africa currently (Maddy-Weitzman 2012, 109).





recognized, which did not go over well in Kabylie. In 2002, good news came 
at last for the Berbers as tamazight was recognized as “national” though 
still not as an official language (2012: 120–122). not even the “Berber ques-
tion” jeopardized the territorial integrity of algeria during the civil war, 
while during the events that shocked even algeria in 2011, the “Berber ques-
tion” was mainly left on the margins. Yet, the alienation of Kabylie from the 
central authorities is still progressing (2012: 133–134). Still we can conclude 
that algerian Berbers do not have secession tendencies and will not ask for 
a separate state, rather they will try to achieve more rights within algeria. 
Furthermore, we also do not believe, no matter how complex and violent 
the situation within Libya will develop, that Libya will dissolve into smaller 
states.
3.2. Foreign powers and the allure of integration
the triple transformation that affected the eastern europe countries has, 
thus, no parallel in north africa. We can stipulate here that during the 
arab Spring there was just one transition -from autocracies to democracies, 
if even that. What about the influence of external forces? the influence of 
external forces on north africa was surely less powerful than the influence 
of uSSr on eastern europe. Furthermore, the influence of external forces 
as veto powers or promoters of democracy was different in different periods 
(Cold War, the 1990s, post 9/11). egypt, in Sadat’s time, was conducting the 
“leadership of tactics” toward the uSSr, and certainly not policies guided 
by firm principles, although it was receiving military help from uSSr. even 
though Sadat found out that in 1971 the Soviets planned to topple him, he 
signed a friendship treaty with them. a year later, Sadat “expelled” 15.000 
Soviet advisers from egypt (rezk 2013, 69–70). afterwards, Sadat began 
egypt’s turn toward uSa. during 30 years of his rule, uS and Great Britain 
perceived Mubarak as a “moderate” arab leader and a “dependable” ally 
(Hollis 2013, 171). after signing the peace treaty with Israel, egypt became 
the largest receiver, second only to Israel, of american overseas military 
assistance (2013: 175–176). However, during the late 1990s Mubarak became 
the subject of criticism of the american administration, although egyptian 
political reform was not high on the uS foreign policy list, at least until G. 
W. Bush came to power (2013: 179). after 2003 (invasion on Iraq), american 
administration started pressuring Mubarak to democratize egypt, which 
he energetically refused. Condoleezza rice in her visit to Cairo in 2005, 
publicly, with an authoritative tone in her voice, asked for a democratiza-
tion of egypt, although she did not describe Mubarak’s regime as autho-
ritarian (Sadiki 2012, 175–176). However, the success of the Muslim brot-
herhood in egypt’s parliamentary elections in 2005 and the civil war that 
broke out in Iraq in 2006, led to the appeasement of american demands. 
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the arab Spring took uS by surprise. although in the beginning they did 
not believe that regime change will happen, by the end of january 2011, 
obama asked for a “peaceful change of the government”. However, the uS 
played a far lesser role here, mostly as an arbiter, compared to the egyp-
tian military, which showed its true face as a main political actor (Hollis 
2013, 184–185).
Six months after his revolution, Gaddafi started wiping out Western 
influence on Libya. He even expelled Italian settlers from Libya. In 1972, 
he banned elections and introduced a death penalty for those who would 
violate this ban (andrew 2013, 196–197). due to his dedication to inter-
national terrorism, with full support of the uSSr, he was not beloved by 
the West. even Sadat himself, to whom Gaddafi looked up, expressed his 
opinion that Gaddafi was totally crazy (2013: 202). With the end of bipolar 
divisions and later the beginning of the global war on terror, Gaddafi found 
himself on the side of the West. the uS completely restored its diplomatic 
relations with Libya in May 2006. the normalization of relations showed 
that the americans gave up on demanding democratization in their rela-
tions with the Middle eastern autocracies (Zoubir 2008, 277–278). In the 
same sense, Gaddafi was an important Western ally in combating terro-
rism, yet this same West facilitated his demise during the arab Spring 
(andrew 2013, 195).
Instead of being pulled to democracy by an outside force, the north 
african countries were combating the challenges of democracy by mutual 
cooperation. neighboring countries even let aside their conflicts and, 
because of the challenges posed by democracy and Islamist movements 
that went hand in hand, started a tighter cooperation in the late 1980s 
and 1990s, the result of which was the signing of the arab Maghreb union 
treaty12 (Zartman 1997, 212–213). the situation in algeria in the late 1980s 
and during the 1990s, led to tunisia’s and algeria’s rapprochement to egypt 
in matters of security – these efforts were called the “Pan-arab Security” 
(1997: 217). algeria, after its independence, was receiving military assi-
stance from the Soviets, and still has weapons contracts with russia today. 
However, due to its historic relations with France, algeria tried to act auto-
nomously in relation to the global powers after gaining independence. It 
is considered that in this sense algeria remained more independent in 
comparison to other oil exporters (akacem 2005, 153). during the civil war 
in the 1990s, external actors had different roles. the algerian government, 
for instance, severed diplomatic relations with Iran in March of 1993, due 
to Iran’s support of the Islamists13 (Zartman 1997, 217–218). France was 
12  the signing countries were Morocco, tunisia and algeria.





primarily focused on protecting trade and its own investments, especially 
in the oil sector. Fear of possible Islamic republic and the flow of the immi-
grants from algeria led France to give support to the algerian government 
(akacem 2005, 157–158). after 1992, the uS started showing more interest 
in algeria. americans were also very loud in demanding free elections. the 
uSa even showed some support for the moderate Islamists because they 
believed that they will facilitate democratization (Zoubir 2008, 270). at 
the same time, they encouraged negotiations between FIS and the algerian 
government and they criticized the government because of its poor human 
rights track record (2008: 272–273). However, after 9/11, the algerian gover-
nment became a uS partner in the war against terror. Yet, a variety of inter-
national nGos, including american, are continuously pressuring for the 
democratization of algeria (akacem 2005, 160–163). the Bush administra-
tion, if nothing more than only rhetorically, demanded further economic 
reforms and the renewal of the electoral process, to deepen its relations 
with algeria (Zoubir 2005, 178). although, during the 1990s the uS was 
supporting the moderate Islamist party ennahda, led by rachid Ghanno-
uchi, with Ben ali’s aspirations to get rid of the Islamists, the contacts 
between the uS and Ghannouchi ended (Zoubir 2008, 286). the american 
war against terror suited Ben ali perfectly to fend off democratization and 
deal with the Islamists (Henry 2008, 299).
the eu should not be too quickly dismissed as an external factor of 
democratization in north africa, but still, the north african countries that 
do share several similar features with the Balkan countries, are not at all in 
the same relation to the eu as the Balkans.14 as Boduszyński (2013: 190–191) 
correctly noticed, under the supervision of the eu, Balkan states are (more 
or less) on a one-way street to join the eu and Croatia already became a 
member on 1st of july 2013.15 Balkan and north african states share the same 
ottoman legacy. as the wars in the 1990s have shown, there are religious 
and ethnic divisions in the Balkans as well, some running even deeper 
than the ones in north africa, and yet all the Balkan states are democra-
cies despite their numerous defects. 16 a strong reason for this is the eu 
conditionality policy, or the so called Copenhagen criteria, which must be 
14  Whitehead (1986) noted that the allure of eeC membership was also a mayor contrib-
uting factor for the democratization of Greece, Spain and Portugal.
15  Croatia and Serbia, in comparison to Central european post-communist states, went 
through transition to democracy later, due to the fact that were entangled in ethnic conflicts 
which protracted the transition. Macedonia and albania were even later to join the club. By 
2008 Macedonia became a democracy, and albania was almost a democracy. their “lateness” 
can be contributed to several factors such as underdevelopment, weak states, and in the case 
of Macedonia ethnic strife. However, in all four cases the eu leverage played as important 
contribution of their democratization (Levitsky and Way 2010, 104, 119).
16  on defective democracies, see Merkel (2004: 2011).
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fulfilled by all candidates before becoming full members. In the case of 
north africa there is no conditionality. Yet, this does not mean there are 
no eu programs aimed toward the democratization of north africa. the 
eu conducts partnership programs with the Mediterranean belt of africa 
and the Middle east17 (i.e. euroMed and enP), in the sense of a long-
term process of change, with the goal of economically binding the Medi-
terranean belt of north africa and the Middle east, to Western liberal 
democracies. although the main emphasis remained on economic coope-
ration (attinà 2005, 149), one should keep in mind that Western moderni-
zation theories stipulate that economic development will in the end lead 
to democratization (Merkel 2011, 55–63). However, 9/11 also influenced 
the eu leaders to change their attitude and, for instance, in the case of 
algeria, to accept the formal position of the algerian government regar-
ding their refusal to negotiate with the Islamists. up to 9/11, human rights 
were top priority for the eu. the eu, for example, regularly declined to 
extradite Islamists taking refuge on its terrirory. Yet, 9/11 changed everyt-
hing and the eu became an important partner to algeria in combating 
terrorism (Zoubir 2005, 176). It should be mentioned, nonetheless, that 
the eu’s programs for north africa and the Middle east have continued. 
joffé (2008: 311) believes that one of the aims of these programs is achieving 
soft security by means of economic cooperation. this is expected to result 
in increasing democratic governance and respect for human rights. Still, 
the eu never introduced sanctions for the countries in the north africa 
because of human rights violations or lack of democracy (joffé 2008, 314). 
Boduszyński (2013, 197) has noticed that the eu dealing with this region 
never used negative conditioning, or in other words there was a “carrot” for 
advancement but never a “stick” for regression. another problem is that 
despite the large financial aid provided by the West to the countries of 
the region, it was still insufficient during the arab Spring. the Gulf coun-
tries also financed different actors according to their own political agendas 
(Boduszyński 2013, 199–200).
17  even the uS conducted similar programmes (Greater Middle east Initiative and Broader 
Middle east and north africa Initiative) with the goal of economic assistance and democra-
tisation of the Middle east and north africa (Sadiki 2012, 170–171). Yet, these policies were 
during their implementation in conflict due to the american ambivalent relations with the 
region. americans were, similar to the eu, perplexed around the issue of whether they cared 
more about security or democracy, which can produce further insecurity (Zoubir 2008, 271). 
they gave up these programmes in 2006 (Boduszyński 2013), which can be correlated with 
the Muslim brotherhood winning the 2005 parliamentary elections in egypt and the failure 
of the democratic experiment enforced by the outside forces and the beginning of the civil 
war in Iraq in 2006. See more on the correlation between democratisation and the civil war 




4. transformation of the political systems in 
Central america
Central america is a sub region of Latin america and it includes traditional 
states of Central america – Guatemala, Honduras, el Salvador, nicaragua, 
Costa rica, as well as Panama which was included later.18 Historically, the 
states of Central america share common features with Latin america – 
european colonial legacy, wars for independence, bloody civil conflicts, 
authoritarian governments, military rule and democratic transition.
4.1. triple transformation?
Since the focus of this paper is on democratic transition,19 or more preci-
sely, the comparison of the political system transformation of the “third” 
(Central america) and “arab Spring” (north africa) wave states, we shall 
exclude from the analysis Costa rica, which is a “second” wave democracy 
and the only consolidated liberal democracy in Central america. the 
reasons for the fall of the Central american autocratic systems include a 
legitimacy crisis, military conflicts in the region that lasted throughout the 
1980s, and military defeat, in the case of Panama. of external reasons, the 
most important is the Central american peace process led by the european 
Community, the Contadora Group and the Costa rican president oscar 
arias, as well as the diffusion effect. While transformation in Guatemala, 
Honduras, el Salvador and nicaragua was managed by the elites of the old 
regime, Panama suffered a collapse of the regime. Since nicaragua is the 
key state of Central america, to whose history other political system tran-
sformations of the traditional countries in the region are connected, we 
shall start our analysis with nicaragua.
Merkel (2011: 191) takes nicaragua as an exemplar of Central american 
states, in which archaic structures of government lasted until the late 
1990s, which was socially backward, ravaged by civil wars and under a 
strict supervision of the uS. the armed resistance against the rule of the 
Somoza family (1937–1979) began in 1961 under the leadership of the left-
wing Sandinista front FSnL (Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional).20 
18  Panama and Belize (independent from 1981) were accepted by the traditional states 
as part of Central america during the 1990s. due to using the english language and their 
heritage, we do not consider Belize to be a part of Latin america.
19  For information on how democracy in Latin america works see Scartascini et.al. 
(2010).
20  a guerrilla led by Colonel augusto Cesar Sandino fought for seven years (1927–1933) 
against american Marines and nicaragua’s national Guard. the fighting continued after the 
withdrawal of the Marines. Sandino saw in the national Guard, trained by the americans, 
the main threat to nicaraguan independence, so the national Guard ordered his elimina-
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at first, the Sandinistas were small in numbers and without support, yet 
they gained sympathy from the middle class and the Catholic Church. at 
the end of the 1970s, FSLn was more fearsome in its attacks; the regime 
was slowly crumbling, so Somoza fled to Miami on july 17th 1979. FSLn took 
over power and started conducting the Sandinista revolution. there were 
three main goals: building up a democracy, mobilization of the people 
and reaching national sovereignty and development. new institutional 
structures have been created, intensive developmental agricultural policy 
was being implemented, the economy was being transformed and a new 
position was taken at the international stage (Martí and Puig 2011, 175). 
uS and the Sandinistas had relatively good relations during the 1970s and 
1980s. Change occurred in 1981, when Carter, a democrat, was replaced 
in the uS by a republican, reagan, as the president.21 In order to prevent 
the revolution from spilling to neighboring countries, reagan authorized 
a clandestine operation in which the contra-revolutionary forces, known 
as Contras, were supposed to topple the Sandinista government. In accor-
dance with his Cold War policy, reagan also cooperated with right-wing 
governments of Guatemala, el Salvador and Honduras, and rewarded them 
in abundance because the Contras were trained on their territories (Smith 
2012, 88). the era of “Sandinista” transition was prolonged and lasted from 
1979 until 1990. With the revolution, the old regime was exchanged for 
the new one, but the ideas of the new left-wing government were not in 
junction with liberal democracy. the transition was marked by a civil war 
in which some 50.000 people perished. the war spilled over to neighbo-
ring countries, and international actors had positive (Contadora, eC) and 
negative influences (uS) on its course. transition started with Somoza’s fall 
and ended with “constitutive elections” and the Sandinistas’ withdrawal 
from power in 1990.
to show the world that Latin america can solve its regional problems 
on its own, a peace process was initiated. Mexico, venezuela, Colombia and 
Panama created the Contadora Group in 1983, with the aim of pacifying 
Central america. Costa rica also actively participated in the conflict reso-
lution, even though Contras were trained on its territory, and despite its 
neutrality. Its President oscar arias Sanchez was rewarded with a nobel 
peace prize for his efforts. the eC accepted the invitation from arias and 
took part as an intermediary in the negotiations. the Esquipulas agree-
tion during the peace treaty negotiations between the guerrilla and the government. With 
this act, he grew from a national hero to a national martyr, and the resistance against Somo-
za’s rule was named after him (Skidmore, Smith and Green 2010, 100–102).
21  With the exception of reagan’s first 4 years in office, the international ideological context 





ment was signed on august 7th 1987, by five Central american heads of 
state. the agreement foresaw holding free elections and the democrati-
zation of all the countries of the region, the reduction in the number of 
soldiers, withdrawal of the military from politics and their submission to 
civil oversight. the oversight of the implementation of the agreement 
was conducted by the un. In early 1987, a new civil-liberal constitution 
was adopted, and in august of the same year, the Central american peace 
treaty was signed. despite the hegemonic position of the FSLn, consti-
tutive elections in 1990 brought victory to the unified opposition uno 
(Unión Nacional Opositora), led by violeto Chamorro. the Sandinistas 
accepted defeat. the priorities of the Chamorro administration were to 
pacify and demobilize irregular troops, stabilize and integrate the economy 
into the global market and transform existing institutions. the government 
kept the loyalty of the military and the police. Yet, due to the societal 
division between Sandinistas and contra-Sandinistas, democracy was not 
consolidated.
Latin american countries had a difficult time abandoning the colonial 
legacy attitude that, in order to protect national interests, the state should 
control the economy. therefore, in 20th century Latin america, there is no 
opposition between capitalism and socialism, but rather between capita-
lism and semi-feudalism (Lipset and Lakin 2006, 260–261). after WWII, 
Central american economies were facing economic stagnation and grave 
poverty, which led to the fears from leftist revolutions. to prevent and 
secure their stay in power, governments founded a regional economic inte-
gration which was supposed to promote capitalist economic growth. at 
first successful, the Central american regional integration crumbled during 
the world economic and regional political crisis in the 1970s. under the 
pressure of international political and economic actors, Central american 
countries turned to a new common economic developmental model. Yet, 
precisely these developmental models created to prevent revolution and 
regime change, led to uprisings. Poverty was one of the characteristics of 
the region, even though the poorest (Honduras) and the richest (Costa 
rica) countries were the most stable of the region, while other countries, 
affected by rapid industrialization and economic growth during the 1960s 
and 1970s, were the least stable (Booth et al. 2010, 16–17). Most scientists 
described the economic systems of Central america as a dependency – 
„a complex political, economic and social phenomenon that retards the 
human development of the majority in certain privilege-dominated third 
World countries with heavily externally oriented economies“ (2010: 23). 
during the era of rapid economic growth in the region, the surpluses did 
not reach the majority of the poor population, but only the privileged 
minority. 
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the capitalist development of Central america differs from the develo-
pment of industrialized states where, for the economy, key actors are citi-
zens-consumers – in the region citizens were mostly regarded as a potenti-
ally cheap labor force. the elite was not ready to share their profits with the 
rest, so the creation of more socially responsible state-led developmental 
models had to wait for the end of the violent political conflicts in nicaragua 
in 1979 (in Costa rica in 1948). the changes that affected the countries of 
Central america during the 1980s were caused by globalization. economic 
liberalization came in the same package as democratization. Hence, there 
was no transition from socialist economy to capitalism; rather, there was a 
transition from political capitalism to entrepreneurship capitalism. under 
the influence of the uS and IMF, all states of the region accepted the new 
neoliberal economic model and started implementing structural adjus-
tments. the formula of peace and democracy, including monetary stability 
and price stability, led to a partial economic rehabilitation of the region, 
but at the same time, it diminished the capacity of the transitional gover-
nments to increase the wellbeing of the general population and to promote 
economic growth and invest in human capital (2010: 26–27). In the case of 
Central american countries, we cannot discuss transition from a socialist 
economy to a capitalist one, since capitalism already existed in Guatemala, 
el Salvador, Honduras and Panama, it just shifted shape. to enhance the 
position of most of the poor population, nicaragua tried to transform the 
system from capitalist to socialist during the Sandinista revolution. Still, 
the Sandinistas led a moderate and pragmatic economic policy. they had 
recognized all the inherited international debts, they only confiscated the 
property of Somoza and followers, and did not touch the private sector, 
which still carried 50–60 percent of the GdP (2010: 96). the fact that they 
transferred a portion of state property into the hands of the Sandinista 
elite (la piñata) before they stepped down from power, is not a fact in 
their favor.
Civil wars led by guerrilla organizations and military governments in 
el Salvador and Guatemala did not have a revolutionary phase but led to 
the transformation of political systems into democracy. el Salvador had 
a military regime from the 1930s, and the official military party Partido 
de Conciliación Nacional (PCn) from 1948. the rule of the military and 
the oligarchies prevented the reforms from being implemented, yet the 
reformist wing of the military made several attempts at modernization. 
Political mobilization of the peasants (campesinos), also joined by the 
workers and students that demanded political and economic reforms, 
was met with fierce response from the security forces. the leftist guerrilla, 
named after the leader of the rebellion from 1932, augustin Farabundo 




more supporters. the government replied to guerrilla activity with incre-
ased repression. dissatisfied with the political situation in the country 
and in fear of “new nicaragua”, the revolutionary junta (Junta Revoluci-
onaria de Gobierno – jrG) of the younger generation of officers came to 
power in october 1975. to improve the socio-economic conditions in the 
country and prevent the victory of the leftists, they declared the imple-
mentation of necessary reforms – partial land reform, nationalization of 
banks and coffee export (Paige 1999, 34). In spring of 1980, the archbishop 
oscar arnulfo romero, a fierce critic of the socio-political situation, was 
killed in the San Salvador cathedral. By the beginning of 1981, FMLn laun-
ched a fierce offensive against the government. Since the junta did not 
have control over the conservative elements within the military and secu-
rity forces, some 30.000 citizens were killed by military terror during the 
1980–1981 period. In these activities, robert d’aubisson, a person allegedly 
responsible for organizing the assassination on archbishop romero, espe-
cially demonstrated himself. to continue receiving american military and 
economic help, the civilian-military junta led by the demo-Christian, josé 
napoleón duarte (1980–1982), agreed to liberalize the political system. In 
the spring of 1982, elections for the Constitutional assembly were anno-
unced in which the right won the majority and alvara Magaña became the 
head of government (1982–1984). after the presidential election victory, 
financed by the CIa with two million dollars to prevent d’aubisson’s return 
to power, duarte returned to power. despite american help, President 
duarte did not succeed to destroy the FMLn, nor to relieve the pressure 
from the extreme right. Hence, he initiated negotiations with the FMLn 
and took part in signing the Central american Peace agreement in 1987. 
after the Atlacatl counter-guerrilla death squad killed six jesuits and 
their tenants, the american Congressional opposition stopped financing 
the Salvador army, which led to a change of american policy towards el 
Salvador. only then were peace talks taken seriously. they were successfully 
finalized in 1992 when the president alfredo Cristiani (1989–1994), member 
of the moderate faction of the rightist party arena, signed a treaty with 
FMLn, which started the era of the civil democratic regime. the civil war 
lasting 13 years took 75.000 lives. Guerrilla and counter-guerrilla activities 
had grave consequences for the economy on this already extremely poor 
country. Wood (2005: 179–201) believes that el Salvador is an unusual case 
in which transition was forged from the bottom up. the outcome of tran-
sition was a democracy in which both sides gained something. the rebels 
gained political inclusion and agreed to accept the democratic rules of the 
game, while the economic elite gained guarantees of property protection in 
case ex-guerrilla wins the elections. the implementation of the agreement 
was conducted by the un observing mission ounSaL, which was present 
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in el Salvador from 1990 to 1995. Most of the peace agreement decisions 
were partially implemented by 1995, and in 1994, the first elections were 
held in which FMLn won 21 out of 84 parliamentary mandates.
Guatemala was the only traditional Central american state which had 
an experience with democracy (1944–1954) before the change of the poli-
tical system. With american intervention, the progressive arbenza regime 
was toppled and a reactionary military came into power (1954–1996), which 
did not allow for moderate political opposition and led to the creation of 
revolutionary guerrilla movements. at the same time, a strengthened mili-
tary repression toward the indigenous Mayan majority at the end of the 
1970s, led to its armed self-defense occurring parallel to the transformation 
of the Catholic Church grassroots organizations, and a gradual articulation 
of a liberation theology. In the beginning of 1982, various guerrilla organi-
zations united into the urnG (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemal-
teca). the military’s rule was marked by the civil war (1960–1996) between 
guerrilla movements and the army, which, meanwhile, transformed into 
the most brutal armed forces in Latin america. around one million inha-
bitants were displaced, and some 10 percent emigrated. around 200 thou-
sand citizens were killed, 100 thousand women were raped, 440 villages 
were wiped off the face of the earth and 626 massacres were committed. 
the victims were mostly Mayans, suffering genocide and culturicide, the 
fiercest massacres and crimes taking place during ríos Montta’s era of 
the military-reformist regime (1982–1983). the inability to end the civil 
war was one of the crucial reasons for the beginning of the end of the 
authoritarian regime in Guatemala, and the legitimacy crisis was further 
induced by election frauds. the military-reformist regime led a parallel 
politics of repression and political system reforms. the 1965 Constitution 
and election law were revoked, Congress was dismissed, a new election 
law was adopted and elections for the Constitutional assembly were anno-
unced. the assembly adopted a new Constitution in 1985 that, on paper, 
but not in reality, protected basic human rights. the transition was long 
lasting (1985–1999) and managed by the elites of the old regime led by the 
military, which took the mantle of a powerful veto actor. the presidential 
elections of 1985 were semi-competitive and semi-democratic. the most 
progressive candidate, demo-Christian vinicio Cerezo (1986–1991), won. 
His government failed to put the military under civilian control, to improve 
the grave socio-economic situation and to start the peace process off the 
ground. Serious peace talks began only after pressures from the interna-
tional community and the change of american government and policies. 
the left-wing parties were not allowed to compete even in the 1990 elec-
tions, and MaS’s candidate josé Serrano was elected for president, who 




Monsignor rodolfo Quezada toruño of the Catholic bishop conference, 
and the un acted in an observer role, and in january 1994 it took the role 
of peace mediator. the negotiations ended on december 29th 1996 when 
the Final peace agreement22 was signed. an important role was played by 
the “Friends of the peace process group” that consisted of Mexico, Spain, 
norway and the uS, hence, not a single one of the crucial players presumed 
to boycott the peace process. the peace process was supposed to facilitate 
the final transition of Guatemala from an autocratic to a democratic state 
(jonas 2006, 281–285). the reforms of the Constitution agreed upon by the 
peace agreement were supposed to be approved by the citizens at a refe-
rendum, yet in 1999 it was declined, so there was no institutionalization 
of democracy (Kos-Stanišić 2012, 263–264).
Honduras did not have significant guerrilla movements that would 
have fought against authoritarian regimes, yet it was neck deep involved 
in the Central american conflict. From 1932 to 1980, the state was ruled by 
authoritarian civilian-military governments. From 1978, the ruling military 
triumvirate, under pressure from the Carter administration, accepted the 
idea of democratization. In 1980, the national assembly23 convened and in 
1981 elections were announced, in which Honduras elected a civilian pres-
ident for the first time in its history – roberto Suazo Córdova (1981–1985). 
during his mandate, the military still intervened into politics and even the 
new 1982 constitution was subjected to the military doctrine of national 
security. We do not agree with Booth et al. (2010: 30) when they claim that 
in 1982 a regime change took place and that a civilian transitional regime 
came into power. For example, the military forced Suazo to allow the uS 
to use Honduran territory for military bases and camps, in which nica-
raguan Contras were trained. the results of Honduras’s dirty war (1986–
22  The treaty on the protection of human rights was signed in March 1994. It foresaw inter-
national mechanisms of verifying the state of human rights, and un’s verification commis-
sion (MInuGua) was formed, which came to Guatemala by the end of the year. the treaty 
on identity and the rights of the autonomous peoples was signed in March 1995. It was a 
crucial document, which finally should have provided a constitutional right to Guatemalan 
majority autochthonous population, after the new constitution had been adopted, to live 
in a multi-ethnic, multicultural and multilingual state. the crucial Agreement on strength-
ening the civilian rule and the role of the armed forces in a democratic society was signed in 
September 1996. It anticipated constitutional reforms that should see the military put under 
civilian control, the role of the military reduced to defence from foreign threats, the size 
and the budget of the military reduced by 1/3, and self-defence and counter-rebellion forces 
dismissed. the forming of civilian police forces PnC was also planned, which should deal 
with internal security, accompanied by a legislative and judiciary reform. despite the crisis in 
october 1996, The Operative Agreement was signed in december of the same year (the defi- 
nitive ceasefire was agreed upon, as well as constitutional and election reforms, legal reinte-
gration of urnG, partial amnesty for all the sides in the conflict and the schedule of imple-
mentation of all articles of the signed agreements) (see more in Selingon 2005).
23  For information on Latin american party systems see Kitschelt et al. (2010).
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1989) were “only” 187 persons missing and 100 dead (Calderón 1998). Suazo 
peacefully transferred power over to Liberal josé azcona del Hoyo (1986–
1989), who in 1987 was one of the signees of the peace treaty which, in our 
opinion, was the beginning of the era of civil democracy.
Civil wars and the Central american conflict did not lead to the breakup 
of old and creation of new states. It is simple to conclude that there was 
no triple transformation in Central america; hence, only one element was 
present, namely, the transition from authoritarian systems to democratic 
ones. nicaragua went through a double transition, el Salvador and Guate-
mala a prolonged one, Honduras rapid and Panama short-lived. In each 
case, there was only a transition from authoritarian to a democratic poli-
tical system and from the state of war to a peaceful state.
4.2. Foreign powers and the allure of integration
as stated before, the most important cause of the end of the Central 
american autocracies, from all the external factors, was the Central 
american peace process led by the european Community, the Contadora 
Group and the Costa rican President oscar arias, and the diffusion effect. 
transformations and reforms implemented by the Central american coun-
tries were not induced because they wished to enter some international 
integration. all these countries were members of the leading hemisp-
heric organization of american States (oaS) and during the 1960s, they 
created the Central american Common Market (CaCM) which infamo-
usly failed.
even though their goal was not to enter some regional organization, the 
Central american peace process gave birth to the Central american Inte-
gration System (SICa). at the same time, an era of closer relations between 
the eC/eu and Central american countries started. the uS regarded 
Latin america as its own sphere of influence, and it was especially active 
in Central america. Panama represents a Central american state in which 
the uS played and is still playing a role of a very powerful veto actor. the 
country was created because that corresponded with the uS interest to 
build a canal, that would link the atlantic with the Pacific ocean.24 the uS 
figured that the existence of Panama’s army would represent a threat to the 
security of the Panama Canal Zone; therefore, the national police (Policía 
Nacional-Pn) was created. Soon, it gained more relevance, especially after 
24  on november 18th 1903 the Hay-Buneau-varilla agreement was signed by which uSa 
gained the right of occupation and control over the Canal Zone (10 miles) “forever”. Panama 
agreed that in the interest of the security of the Canal the uS can intervene in its internal 
affairs, a right which was legalised by the article vII of the Constitution of Panama. uS 
committed to on a one-time basis payment of $10 million and an annual $250 thousand of 




WWII. It was led by a commander who represented the most influential 
person in Panama. In the 1947–1955 period, it was josé antonio remón 
who reorganized the national police and in 1953, transformed it into a 
well-trained and armed national Guard (Guardia nacional). dissatisfied 
with the oligarchic rule, the Guard executed a military coup in 1968, which 
started the era of the rule of the national Guard (1968–1980). a moderate 
military faction came into power, led by omar torrijos (ropp 1982, 37–41) 
who implemented political and social reforms, invested into education 
and social services, and thus demonstrated how Central american gover-
nments do not necessarily have to be right-wing orientated.25 
despite positive changes, the rule of torrijos was in fact a military 
dictatorship (1968–1981). torrijos succeeded in signing new agreements 
on the Panama Canal in 1977. With the first one, Panama gained soverei-
gnty over the Canal on december 1st 1979, and with the second agreement, 
the neutrality of the Canal was guaranteed, which Panama and the uS had 
equal rights to defend (still, the uS maintained its right to intervene). In 
december 1982, General Manuel antonio noriega Morena became the 
commander of the national Guard and he ruled Panama through puppet 
presidents. although aware of his involvement in drug trafficking and 
money laundering, the CIa supported its associate noriega because he 
helped the uS in arming nicaraguan Contras. When news about noriega’s 
involvement in drug trafficking became public, the uS denounced him. 
they accused him of drug trafficking, money laundering, election fraud 
and a series of homicides. they imposed economic sanctions on Panama 
and asked President delvalle (1985–1988) to discharge noriega from the 
military. Yet, noriega removed delvalle from power and then, in 1989, he 
rigged the elections in which an opposition candidate, Guillermo endara, 
should have won. President George Bush concluded that noriega should 
be toppled. on november 20th 1989, operation “just Cause” commenced, 
during which 20.000 american soldiers brought down noriega’s regime in 
five days.26 the uS justified the intervention by defending Panama’s right 
25  Military adopted a plan of national development (Plan Nacional de Desarollo 1976–
1980), which had inclusion of the people into the political process (participation popular), 
consolidation of national identity and improvement of the people’s standard of living as its 
main goals (Gandásegiu 1989, 40).
26  noriega found refuge in the vatican nunciature, yet on january 1st 1990, he surrendered 
and was transferred into the uS. at the Miami Federal court he went on trial for drug traf-
ficking and racketeering. In 1992, noriega was declared guilty and was sentenced to 40 years 
(later this was reduced to 30 and then to 17 years due to the good behaviour) in prison. Yet, 
in 2010 the uS extradited him to France which, in absentia, convicted him for money laun-
dering. at the end of 2011, France extradited him to Panama, demanding his extradition so 
he would serve three 20 years sentences for the murder of three opposition members in the 
1980s. (Panama ex-dictator Manuel noriega flies home, available at http://www.theguardian.
com/world/2011/dec/11/panama-manuel-noriega-home).
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to self-determination, rightfully theirs by international law and article 51 
of the un Charter, which noriega denied. the goal of invasion was to bring 
noriega to justice and replace him with Guillermo endara’s government, 
therefore, to rebuild democracy and secure the integrity of the Panama 
Canal agreement (Smith 2000, 293–297). at the end of 1989, the election 
tribunal confirmed endara’s victory in the May elections. President endara 
abolished Panama’s armed forces in 1990, which was afterwards included 
in the Constitution in 1994. By doing that, Panama became the second 
Central american and Latin american country, after Costa rica, with no 
military. the transition to democracy was short and it was institutiona-
lized in 1990, when a new constitution was delivered.
5. Conclusion
When we scratch just a bit under the surface, the data indicates entirely 
different experiences in the transformation of the political systems of 
Central america and north africa, during the arab Spring, on one side 
and east europe on the other side. the triple transformation that affected 
communist europe simply does not exist in cases of Central america and 
north africa. In the case of Central america, we can talk about transition 
from autocracy to (defective) democracy, while in the case of north africa 
it is still questionable. In the last case, perhaps the approach of cyclic tran-
sition towards democracy, as described by Sadiki (2012), or first a demo-
cratic breakthrough that is followed by a withdrawal of democracy, is more 
appropriate. the countries of eastern europe are now mostly democratic. 
Yet, as Central america shows, transition can last for a very long time with 
democratic and counter-democratic waves, which was also the case with 
north africa.
From the Monroe doctrine, the uS finds Central america as its 
“backyard” and thus believes it has the right to intervene. this was espe-
cially true during the Cold War. It started with the 1954 intervention in 
Guatemala and culminated during the civil wars and interstate conflicts 
that affected the region during the 1980s. the uS represented a powerful 
veto actor that in the first phase of the Central american conflict not only 
financed the Contras, but also obstructed the conclusion of the peace 
agreement. thus, the positive international actor’s role was taken by 
the eC. In north africa, the influence of the international veto actors on 
democratization was generally low. there was no regional hegemon and 
the states of the region opportunistically transferred from the eastern to 
the Western block, following their own interests and without observable 
sanctions from the global powers. Furthermore, global powers were very 
interested in “flirting” and bringing these countries over to their sphere of 




have pushed the countries of the region to the enemy camp. the very same 
countries also participated in the nonaligned Movement. France, which 
should have had the role of the hegemon in north africa, simply did not 
have the same strength during the Cold War as it did during its “golden 
age” as a colonial power. the 1990s brought the victory for liberal demo-
cracy over communism, which also led to the pressure by the West for the 
democratization of the region.
However, 9/11 and the war against terror that followed again led the 
West to change its stance. even the americans, after the enflaming of the 
civil war in Iraq, gradually abandoned their democratization pressure on 
the region. Yet, the eu carries out more patient long-term policies with the 
aim to democratize the region. However, due to the absence of conditio-
nality, these policies have limited success. at the same time the eu found 
itself in the midst of an economic crisis which diminished its ability to 
economically help north africa. It neither helps that the citizens of the 
region are painfully aware that some of the european leaders had good 
relations with ex-dictators, such as Berlusconi with Gaddafi, which does 
not instill confidence in the honesty of the West about democratization 
of north africa.
Indeed, the West led inconsistent and mutually conflicted policies 
toward the region, based on security, economic interests and an honest 
wish for democratization (Zoubir 2008, 266). However, many of these poli-
cies depend on the events “in the field” and how the West interprets them.27 
therefore, Sadiki (2012) finds that the uS foreign policy, and foreign poli-
cies of other Western countries, cannot be looked at through the paradigm 
of “hard” realism and “idealistic” liberalism, but a more appropriate anal-
ytical tool should be provided by constructivism. If we compare the influ-
ence of veto actors in the cases of Central america and north africa, we 
can conclude that in Central america, the uS had a more significant role as 
a veto actor. the allure of integration into international organizations was 
not a significant factor in implementing political system reforms in either 
region. the level of similarities in both regions is considerably high.
27  See the first three chapters of the book Scripting Middle East Leaders: The Impact of 
Leadership Perceptions on US and UK foreign policy on the importance of perception of polit-
ical leaders on the creation of strategic scripts (Freedman 2013; Stein 2013; Michaels 2013).
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Table 1. North Africa 
Country Triple 
Transformation
The Influence of 
international (veto) 
actors
Reforms due to the allure of 
membership in international 
organizations
Egypt No USSR US No
Libya No USSR US
EC/EU
No
Tunisia No US FR
EC/EU
No
Algeria No USSR US
FR EC/EU
No
Source: made by the authors
Table 2. Central America
Country Triple 
Transformation








Guatemala No US EC No
Honduras No US EC No
El Salvador No US EC No
Nicaragua Maybe? US EC No
Panama No US No
Source: made by the authors
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Sažetak
transformacija političkih sustava u Sjevernoj africi  
i Srednjoj americi
od samog početka takozvanog arapskog proljeća u zimu 2010. godine različi-
ti izvori povlače usporedbe s padom komunizma i demokratizacijom Istočne 
europe 1989/1991. Čak je i sam naziv ovog političkog fenomena sličan nazivi-
ma političkih promjena u komunističkoj Istočnoj europi. usporedba s Istoč-
nom europom bila je snažno naglašavana, a argumenti koji tom toku misli idu 
u prilog imaju neku težinu. Međutim, članak tvrdi da, zbog iznimne specifič-
nosti komunističkih režima u Istočnoj europi, usporedba s arapskim proljećem 
nije u potpunosti adekvatna. Istočna europa prošla je kroz trostruku tranziciju 
i bila je pod jakim utjecajem želje da se pridruži europskoj uniji, za razliku od 
Sjeverne afrike. Zbog toga članak tvrdi kako je demokratizacija Srednje ame-
rike daleko adekvatnija za usporedbu sa zemljama arapskog proljeća.
Ključne riječi: demokratizacija, transformacija, politički sustavi, Sjeverna 
afrika, Srednja amerika.
